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13 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cabell

SUBJECT : Status of Governor Stassen's Disarmament Activities

1. At the last meeting of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems on 29 August, Governor Stassen indicated that he would seek the President's decision with regard to certain proposals relative to disarmament policy. I do not know whether he has had any conversations with the President on this subject and, in view of the international situation, I doubt that disarmament will be a very popular subject for discussion in the immediate future. However, in the event that references should come up in the NSC or elsewhere I will summarize developments of the last two months for your information.

2. On June 29, Governor Stassen addressed a memorandum to Members of the National Security Council in which he outlined at some length the background information as a basis for recommendations relative to U.S. policies on disarmament preliminary to U.N. meetings and Disarmament Committee discussions. Individual members were asked to be prepared to discuss these recommendations with the President after 12 July.

(a) Both Defense and AEC took exception in writing to many of the proposals and in meetings of the Committee, State and others joined them.

(b) On 15 August during Governor Stassen's absence, his Deputy, Ambassador Pease, endeavored to reduce the proposals to documents which could be presented to the U.N. Disarmament Committee at forthcoming discussions. However, these proposals met a cold reception in the Committee. At a meeting on 27 August on Governor Stassen's return, State and Defense urged that before considering these documents Governor Stassen should revise his proposals of June 29 in the light of departmental comments and should obtain decisions as to what U.S. policy should be. Governor Stassen took some time to familiarize himself with Ambassador Pease's papers and the departmental reactions and then on 29 August made the statement to which I have referred.

3. The policy problems involved appear to be primarily concerns of State, Defense and AEC. The positions they have taken appear to be entirely sound and are supported in all essentials by the comments of ONE on the proposals.

4. For your information, the proposals and comments can be very briefly summarized as follows:

Governor Stassen's Proposals:

A. After 1 July 1957 future production of fissionable material to be exclusively for non-weapons use under international inspection and supervision.

B. and C. Provide small nuclear-equipped forces to UN under Security Council and NATO under SHAPE.

D. Insure UK adequate nuclear posture by 1 July 1957.

E. Transfer from previous nuclear production for weapons purposes to supervised peaceful purposes in successive increments.

F. Ban tests of nuclear weapons after 1 July 1957 and agree to effective inspection systems.

G. Research and development for outer-space objects to be for peaceful purposes only with international inspection and participation in tests.

H. Continue negotiations for adoption Eisenhower's aerial inspection combined with Bulgarian-type ground inspection.

I. Agreements to be subject to termination on one year's written notice.

J. Consider progressive development of an inspection and control system.

K. Consult German Federal Republic relative arms limitation effect on unification.

L. Consider application of agreements when made to China.

5. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that an effective inspection and control system is essential preliminary to any disarmament agreement; opposes cessation nuclear production prior to existence of such inspection system; considers provision of nuclear forces to UN and NATO would restrict freedom of action of U.S. in own security; points out that nuclear proposals would require Congressional action; maintains that continued tests are essential as long as nuclear stock-piles exist; notes that any agreement should provide for immediate termination in case of violation; points out that accepting a gradual development of inspection and control system is fraught with grave danger; considers any discussion with German Federal Republic most undesirable for U.S. security from military point of view.

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6. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense supported the JCS position and urged adherence to the principle that "an acceptable and proven procedure for inspection and verification of armaments should be a prerequisite to an international agreement on disarmament."

7. The AEC took exception to Governor Stassen's estimate that 15 or 20 other countries could have nuclear weapons in the near future; notes that inspection system to insure production for peaceful use could not be established by 1 July 1957 but would require at least 3 years after agreement; notes that provision of nuclear weapons to U.K. would require Congressional action and affect future adequacy U.S. stockpiles; notes that determination of adequacy stockpiles should precede any agreement to terminate production; opposes any agreement to ban tests apart from a general disarmament agreement which includes an effective and proven inspection system; believes an inspection system to supervise outer-space missile tests possible but more difficult of establishment than detection of low-yield explosions; considers that activities necessary to an inspection system are not items for negotiation after agreement but are an indispensable prerequisite; does not look with favor on any proposal for down-grading priority of aerial inspection and making it an item to be negotiated and implemented progressively.

8. The Board of National Estimates studied Governor Stassen's proposals and made detailed comments as a basis for background information for the DCI. The Board considers the date of 1 July 1957 would have propaganda value but little chance of USSR acceptance; does not consider that a UN nuclear force would be an effective sanction against major powers; considers the idea of legitimizing nuclear weapons contrary to wide-spread sentiment for outlawing such use; considers transfer from weapons to non-weapons use would not reduce the threat from viewpoint of non-nuclear powers; considers USSR unlikely to accept inspection of any outer-space weapons tests; points out that ground inspection proposed by Bulganin considered inadequate to meet U.S. requirements; points out that discussions with the Federal Republic are undesirable as the proposals would have serious disadvantages to the Adenauer Government.

SIGNED

L. K. THROCKMORTON, Jr.
General, USA (Ret.)

LKT/c

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